A Primer on China’s Bribery Regulation: Status Quo, Development, Drawback, and Proposed Solution by Zeng, Fanyu
American University Washington College of Law
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College
of Law
Upper Level Writing Requirement Research Papers Student Works
2017
A Primer on China’s Bribery Regulation: Status
Quo, Development, Drawback, and Proposed
Solution
Fanyu Zeng
American University Washington College of Law, fz7351a@student.american.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/
stu_upperlevel_papers
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Upper Level Writing Requirement Research Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zeng, Fanyu, "A Primer on China’s Bribery Regulation: Status Quo, Development, Drawback, and Proposed Solution" (2017). Upper
Level Writing Requirement Research Papers. 33.
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/stu_upperlevel_papers/33
 1 / 44 
 
A Primer on China’s Bribery Regulation: Status Quo, 
Development, Drawback, and Proposed Solution 
Fanyu Zeng 
 
Abstract 
Today, the People's Republic of China (hereinafter China) has 
become one of the largest economic entities in the world. With the 
development of China, the problem of bribery has imposed more negative 
impacts on China’s government and market. This paper is on China’s 
current regulations on bribery.  
This paper is divided into six parts: (1) Introduction to China’s legal 
regulation on bribery; (2) Who can be bribed in China? (3) What 
constitutes bribery under China laws? (4) Defenses against bribery 
charges; (5) Punishment and Liability (Criminal Punishment, 
Administrative Punishment, and Private Action); and (6) Drawbacks and 
Proposals for China’s anti-bribery laws.  
I use a comparative-study methodology in this paper to compare 
China’s anti-bribery laws with International anti-bribery conventions (like 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption and other countries 
similar laws (like Foreign Corruption Practice Act, UK Anti-Bribery Act 
2010, California Unfair Competition Law, etc.). Based the comparison, I 
identify China’s anti-bribery laws’ disadvantages in legal system and 
legal practice, and provide constructive advices. 
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Key Words: Briber and Recipient, Non-Property Interest, 
Specific-Intent Defense, Internal Control.  
Part 1: Introduction to China’s Legal Regulations on Bribery 
Since 1978, China has been adopting the “Open and Reform Policy”. 
Under the policy, China has begun to rebuild its legal system destroyed 
by the Great Cultural Revolution. With the significant economic 
development based on the “Open and Reform Policy,” China is suffering 
the same problem as most economic high-growth countries: bribery. 
China is a socialist country led by the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”), 
and there are many state-owned or controlled enterprises lacking effective 
supervision. A private person or a private company who wants to make a 
transaction with the state owned or controlled companies is very likely to 
bribe them. With the development of the globalization trend, more and 
more international companies have entered China. They have a strong 
incentive to open the market by illegal means, like bribing China’s state 
officials. To cope with the above corruption problems, China paid more 
attention to make laws regulating bribery. In detail, regarding China’s 
domestic anti-bribery regulations, China has established criminal 
punishment and administrative punishment against bribery violations in 
its Criminal Law and Anti-Unfair Competition Law, respectively. 
Furthermore, a private party is entitled to bring a civil lawsuit against a 
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briber when the briber makes him suffer damages. Regarding China’s 
participation in international anti-bribery legal practice, China has 
become a member state of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (hereinafter UNCAC), and joined the working group of 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (hereafter OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention). Although China has far to go in becoming a transparent 
country, it has made some achievements in anti-bribery practice.  
 
Part 2: Who can be bribed in China?  
On a private party’s perspective, the burning question for them is to 
know who can he or she bribe in China? When you give a red packet (gift 
of money) to a Chinese friend, does it constitute a bribe? It depends on 
who receives a red packet and why you give the red packet to him or her. 
Thus, the first thing we need to know is who can become a target of a 
briber? 
Ⅰ. Bribing a China State Functionary 
   Unlike in the United States, China does not adopt “public official” in 
the crime of bribing a person. Instead, China uses the term “state 
functionary” to describe the person performing public power. When a 
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common person, especially a foreign person, first sees this term, he or she 
is very likely to feel confused: what is a state functionary? Is there any 
difference between the concept of government official and that of state 
functionary? 
1. What is a state functionary under China law? 
It is a common sense that to bribe a person exercising public power is 
illegal. Nevertheless, the question becomes a bit complex because there is 
a difference between “state functionaries” and “persons who perform 
public service in state organs.” Unlike the United States or the United 
Kingdom, China does not make a very clear line between government 
official and a non-government person. Under Article 93 of China’s 
Criminal Law, the concept of state functionaries is broader than the 
concept of “persons who perform public service in state organs.” The 
former concept also includes “persons who perform public service in 
state-owned companies or enterprises, institutions or people's 
organizations, persons who are assigned by State organs, State-owned 
companies, enterprises or institutions to companies, enterprises or 
institutions that are not owned by the State or people's organizations to 
perform public service and the other persons who perform public service 
according to law shall all be regarded as State functionaries.” The 
relationship between the two concepts are showed by the following 
figure: 
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China is a socialist country. The public power is distributed to 
different organizations and people even though they are not working in 
the government, if we use a narrow perspective to define the concept of a 
government. We use China’s village-committee system as an example. 
Under China’s administrative law, a village cannot constitute a local 
government. A town is the basic-level government in China. A village is 
managed by its village committee. And the directors of the village are 
elected by the village’s residents. Thus, theoretically we cannot say that 
the directors of the village committee are employed by the government of 
China or working for the China’s government. Nevertheless, under 
China’s judicial interpretation, a director of the village committee can 
become a target of a briber.1 For example, in a village of Fanyu City, 
Guangzhou Province, all the residents of this village received about $40 
million as compensation for their taken property. Five directors of the 
                                                             
1 Article 12 of The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of 
Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of the Law in the Handling of Criminal Bribery (See 
https://www.cov.com/files/upload/Carlson_SPP_SPC_Judicial_Interpretation_on_Bribery_Enforcement.pdf) 
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village committee were responsible for keeping the huge amount of 
money. A bank officer gave $250,000 to the five officers and asked them 
to invest about $6 million in their finance management products as 
compensation. Ultimately, the five officers were convicted of receiving 
briberies as public functionaries. The reason why village committee 
officers can be deemed as state functionaries in particular circumstances 
is that the village committee is on behalf of the government to regulate 
the local society. Thus, it is reasonable that the Criminal Code regard the 
village committee officers as state functionaries when they are stand for 
the government to manage the gross-root society.2 
The reasons that China’s criminal law created two related and 
different concepts (State Functionary and Persons who perform public 
service in state organs): 
a) Economic Reason 
China has many state-owned or controlled enterprises because it is 
a socialist country. Under China’s constitution, these public assets belong 
to the whole Chinese people. 3  The directors of these state-owned 
enterprises are on behalf of whole Chinese people to keep and manage 
these public assets. Thus, it is reasonable to deem these state-owned or 
controlled enterprises as managers. It is also necessary to regulate and 
                                                             
2 Article 111 of Constitution the People’s Republic of China (See 
http://www.cpd.com.cn/gb/flfg/2003-04/11/content_1821.htm) 
3 Article 7 of Constitution the People’s Republic of China (See 
http://www.cpd.com.cn/gb/flfg/2003-04/11/content_1821.htm) 
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discipline bribery violations in the transaction when one side is a 
state-owned enterprise. In practice, China’s state owned-enterprises are 
high-risk areas of bribery violations. For example, the former chairman of 
PetroChina Company Limited, Jiang Jiemin, was convinced of crime of 
receiving briberies, abusing power, and holding a huge amount of 
property with unidentified sources; The court determined that the 
briberies received by Jiang were worth more than $2 million not 
including the huge amount of property with unidentified sources. 4 
b) Political Reason  
The village committees are not deemed as an independent 
administrative level in China. The leader of a village committee is 
directly elected by the local residents. Nevertheless, these village 
committees receive lots of subsidiaries from the central government and 
the local governments. These village committees distribute the 
subsidiaries to the rural residents and assist the government in managing 
the rural society. Thus, under the interpretation of Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress (a legislative interpretation that has the 
same effect as the enacted statutes), in particular circumstances, an officer 
of village committees can be regarded as a state functionary. 
2. Foreign Countries’ and International Organization’s Legal 
Practice of the Term “Foreign Public Official” 
                                                             
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiang_Jiemin 
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1) United States  
A. FCPA  
The FCPA does not adopt the term “state functionary”. Instead, the 
FCPA’s anti-bribery provision apply to corrupt payments to: (1) “any 
foreign political official;” (2) “any foreign political party or official 
thereof;” (3) “any candidate of foreign for foreign political office;” or (4) 
any person, while knowing that all or a portion of the payment will be 
offered, given, or promised to an individual falling within of these three 
categories.5 
The FCPA defines “foreign official” as including: any officer or 
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or 
instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any 
person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such 
government or department, agency or in instrumentality or for or on 
behalf of any such public international organizations. 6  
Foreign officials under the FCPA include officers or employee of a 
department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign government. When a 
foreign government is organized in a fashion similar to the U.S. system, 
what constitutes a government department or agency is typically clear 
(e.g., a ministry of energy, national security agency, or transportation 
authority). For example, the United States has state-owned entities, like 
                                                             
5 Section 30A(a)(1)-(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)-(3); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)-(3), 
78dd(a)(1)-(3).  
6 Section 30A(f)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A); 15 U.S.C. 78dd-2(h)(2)(A); 78dd-3(f)(2)(A).  
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the Tennessee Valley Authority, that are instrumentalities of the 
government. 7 
However, governments are organized in very different ways, like 
China.8 In a differently-structured foreign government, many briberies 
happen through state-owned and state-controlled entities, particularly in 
such areas as aerospace and defense manufacturing, banking and finance, 
healthcare and life sciences, energy and extractive industries, 
telecommunications, and transportation. 9  
For example, Petroleos Mexicanos ("Pemex") was a national oil 
company wholly owned by the government of the Republic of Mexico, 
and was an instrumentality of the Mexican government. Crawford 
Enterprises, Inc. ("CEI") was a corporation organized under the laws of 
Texas with its principal offices in Houston, Texas. CEI was in the 
business of selling compression equipment systems to Pemex for use in 
the exploration, production and transmission of Mexican oil and natural 
gas. Similarly, Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. ("Ruston") and C.E. Miller 
Corporation ("Cemco") was a corporation engaged in the development, 
production, and sale of turbine compression equipment for use in the 
petroleum industry. In order to obtain purchase orders for turbine 
compression systems and related equipment, CEI, along with Cemco, 
                                                             
7 McCarthy v. Middle Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp., 466 F. 3d 399, 411 n. 18.  
8 See generally, World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership, 
World Bank Policy Research Report at 78 (1995); Sunita Kikeri and Aishetu Kolo,  
9 Id. at 1.  
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Solar and Ruston, engaged in a conspiracy to pay Pemex officials bribes 
equal to approximately 4.5% to 5% of each Pemex purchase order for 
compression equipment systems in which CEI participated. On 
September 17, 1982, the US Department of Justice filed a criminal 
complaint against Cemco and the president, chairman of the board, and 
majority shareholder of Cemco, charging them with aiding and abetting 
under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. 10  Accordingly a 
state-owned company was deemed as a department, agency, or 
instrumentality of a foreign government. A foreign state-owned company 
is within the scope of the concept to the “foreign officials.” To bribe a 
foreign state-owned company’s official may trigger the FCPA’s 
anti-bribery provision.  
B. Domestic Bribery Statute 
The U.S. has a domestic bribery statute to regulate domestic 
bribery of public officials.11 Under 18 U.S.C. 201, the domestic bribery 
statute uses the phrase “public official” to describe the person performing 
government power. This concept not only includes the officials or 
employees of the government, but also covers “any official function, 
under or by authority”. 12Accordingly, to be a public official under the 
context of the United States law is not required to work in a particular 
department oragency.  
                                                             
10 United States of America v. C.E. Miller Corporation, et al., No. 82-cr-788 (C.D. Cal. Sept.17, 1982) 
11 18 U.S.C. 201 
12 Id.  
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According to the FCPA and the domestic bribery statute, both the 
phrase “foreign official” and the phrase “public official” are broad 
concepts. Both of them hold an open attitude to include all the people 
exercising public power under the authority of the government into the 
scope of “public or foreign official”.  
2) United Kingdom  
The Bribery Act 2010 is the main act regulating bribery for the United 
Kingdom. Under Section 6 of the Bribery Act 2010, like the FCPA, the 
Bribery Act 2010 adopts the term “foreign public officials”.  
“Foreign public official” means an individual who— 
(a)holds a legislative, administrative or judicial position of any kind, 
whether appointed or elected, of a country or territory outside the United 
Kingdom (or any subdivision of such a country or territory), 
(b)exercises a public function 
(i)for or on behalf of a country or territory outside the United 
Kingdom (or any subdivision of such a country or territory), or 
(ii)for any public agency or public enterprise of that country or 
territory (or subdivision), or 
(c)is an official or agent of a public international organization.13 
We find that both UK Bribery Act 2010 and the FCPA define the 
“public official” in a broad context, which includes officers or employee 
                                                             
13 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/section/6 
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of a department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign government. 
3) UNCAC 
Under Article 2 of UNCAC, the term “ public official” shall mean: (i) 
any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial 
office of a State Party, whether appointed or elected, whether permanent 
or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective of that person’s 
seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public function, including 
for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides a public service, as 
defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the 
pertinent area of law of that State Party; (iii) any other person defined as a 
“public official” in the domestic law of a State Party. However, for the 
purpose of some specific measures contained in Chapter II of this 
Convention, “public official” may mean any person who performs a 
public function or provides a public service as defined in the domestic 
law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that 
State Party.” 
Additionally, the term “foreign public official” means any person 
holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a 
foreign country, whether appointed or elected; and any person exercising 
a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or 
public enterprise.14  
                                                             
14 Article 2 of UNCAC (See  
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On one hand, UNCAC tries to define the term “public official” based 
on where they work. If the person is “holding a legislative, executive, 
administrative or judicial office of a State Party,” he or she will be a 
“public official”. On the other hand, UNCAC does not ignore that the 
people “who perform a public function or provides a public service” or 
“exercise a public function” can constitute a “(foreign) public official 
even though he or she is not working in the “legislative, executive, 
administrative, or judicial office”. 15Thus, under UNCAC, whether a 
person is working in a legislative, executive, administrative, or judicial 
office is not a required element to be a (foreign) public official. 
Conversely, being a (foreign) public official requires authorization to 
perform or exercise a public function, or provide a public service.  
3. A Comparative Perspective among Foreign Countries, 
International Public Organization, and China in how to Define 
People who Perform a Public Function or Provide a Public 
Service.  
1) Difference 
The United Kingdom, the United States, the UNCAC, and China 
used different phrases to describe the people using public power and 
performing a public service. Foreign countries and international public 
organizations prefer to use the term “Public Official.” Instead, China 
                                                             
15 https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf 
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prefers to use term “State Functionary.”  
2) Similarity 
In a literal analysis, although they use different phrases to describe 
the people using public power and performing public service, we can find 
the literal similarity between the two phrases. Under the Black Law 
Dictionary, the phrase “official” is defined as “… a person elected or 
appointed to carry out some portion of a government’s sovereign 
powers.”16 The Black Law Dictionary defines the phrase “state” as “an 
institution of self-government within a large political entity.”17 Further, 
the phrase “functionary” is defined as “someone who fills a specific role 
in a political party or some other organization. We tend to picture them as 
people in gray suits who follow the boss's orders and don't think for 
themselves.”18 Comparing the two terms, we find the similarity is that 
both are describing people carrying out the sovereign power, performing 
public service, and exercising public functions.   
In an empirical analysis of China law, the FCPA, the Anti-Bribery 
Act 2000, and the UNCAC include any officer or employee excising 
public power or function. 
4. Conclusion  
Although China has more complicated regulation in some particular 
circumstances, like the directors of the village committee, which results 
                                                             
16 Black Law Dictionary, Forth Pocket Edition (2011) 
17 Id.  
18 https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/functionary 
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in China use different phrases to describe the people performing public 
service. Nonetheless, by the above comparison, the term “state 
functionary” and “public official” have  basically a similar meaning: all 
of them are describing people exercising public power or function. 
Accordingly, we can say the term “state functionary” basically amounts 
to “public official” in most circumstances.  
Ⅱ. Bribing a China Public Sector 
1. Introduction 
Under China’s Criminal Code, it is illegal to bribe a public sector with 
a specific intent to pursuing an illegal interest.19  
2. What is a Public Sector? 
The Black Law Dictionary defines “public sector” as “the part of 
the economy or an industry that is controlled by the government.”20 
China is a socialist country and has more varieties in public sectors: state 
organ, state-owned company, enterprise, institution and people's 
organization. 21 
 
3. What is the Difference between Bribing a State Functionary and 
a Public Sector? 
                                                             
19 Article 391 of China’s Criminal Code (See 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/new/23223a23228a2010/20101222shangf111042.shtml) 
20 Black Law Dictionary, Forth Pocket Edition (2011) 
21 Article 391 of China’s Criminal Law (See 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/new/23223a23228a2010/20101222shangf111042.shtml) 
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The main difference is the target. The target of bribing a state 
functionary must be a natural person. A legal person cannot be a target in 
a crime of bribing a state functionary. Conversely, the target of bribing a 
public sector are state organ, state-owned company, enterprise, institution 
and people's organization. Thus, a natural person cannot be the target of 
the crime of bribing a public sector.22 
 
Ⅲ. Bribing a Private Person (Commercial Bribery)  
1. Comparing Bribing a Private Person and Bribing a State 
Functionary  
Comparing with bribing a state functionary, they have many 
similarities: both needs a specific intent of corruption; and in a criminal 
prosecution, both require the provided value cannot below a minimum 
threshold. 23 Nevertheless, they have some differences:  
The difference between bribing a private person and bribing a public 
functionary is the target of the bribe. Whether the target of bribery is a 
public functionary or a private unit or person. Theoretically, this is a very 
distinctive and clear.  
However, in practice it is a little confusing for a layperson to 
                                                             
22 Article 391 and Article 389 of China’s Criminal Law ((See 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/new/23223a23228a2010/20101222shangf111042.shtml) 
23 Article 389 and Article 164 of China’s Criminal Law (See 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/new/23223a23228a2010/20101222shangf111042.shtml) 
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distinguish them in a mixed ownership enterprise. The mixed ownership 
enterprise refers to an enterprise’s share owned by China’s government 
and other private people and or private entities. In a mixed ownership, 
you could find there are state functionaries appointed by China’s 
government and private officers which are co-existing in the mixed 
ownership enterprise. In this scenario, if the briber’s target is an 
appointed state functionary, the briber could commit a crime of bribing a 
state functionary. And if the bribery provider’s target is private officer, he 
orshe could commit a crime of bribing a private person. 24 
The difference is important not only because the two situations 
constitute different crimes, but because the criminal penalties are 
different in the two crimes. Criminal penalties in the crime of bribing a 
state functionary is much heavier than that in the crime of bribing a 
private unit/person. In the former crime, the heaviest criminal penalty 
could carry life imprisonment while the later crime could carry a 10-year 
imprisonment. The reason for a huge difference in criminal penalty 
between the two crimes is that the crime of bribing a state function is 
more harmful because it could erode the public power system. 
2. Foreign Countries’ Legal Practice in Commercial Bribery 
   Unlike China, the United States is a federal country, meaning the 
federal government and the state government share the power in making 
                                                             
24 Citation 
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legislation. For commercial bribery, the state government has the 
authorization to make laws. The California “Commercial Bribery” law is 
as an example:  
1) Elements  
Under Penal Code Section 641.3, the prosecution must each prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt, are as follows: 
 An employee who with the intent to injure or defraud; 
 Solicits, accepts, or agrees to solicit or accept; 
 Money or anything else of value that is more than $250; 
 From someone who is not the employer; 
 And does so without the knowledge or consent of the employer; 
and 
 And is done so in return for using his/her position for the benefit 
of that person. 
2) Defenses  
Under Penal Code Section 641.3, there are two kinds of defenses in 
California against a commercial bribery charge: 
First, the defendant can bring a no-corrupt-intent defense. Under 
Penal Code Section 641.3, a person cannot be a briber if the value 
provider does not provide the value “corruptly.” Under the Black Law 
Dictionary, the term “corruptly” means that “[it] indicates a wrongful 
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desire for pecuniary gain or other advantages.”25 For example, a gift or 
offer of something, such as tickets to a sporting event or a case of wine, 
may have been offered or sent innocently and with no intent to influence 
the other person. Also, the employee or recipient of the gift may have 
accepted it with no intent to award a contract or do something in return. 
So long as there was no conduct or act taken that could be construed as 
undermining or damaging the interests of the employer, there is no 
criminal act. Second, under the Penal Code Section 641.3, a defendant 
can argue that the provided value is less than $250.  
 
3. A Comparative Perspective between China and California in 
Commercial Bribery Law.  
1) Corrupt Defense 
Both China and California have the corrupt defense. Under Article 
164 of China’s Criminal Law, “whoever, for the purpose of seeking 
illegitimate benefits, gives money or property to any employee of a 
company or enterprise… shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment 
of not less than three years but not more than 10 years and shall also be 
fined.” 
If the value provider does not provide the value corruptly, the 
provider is not guilty. In other words, if the provider does not intend to 
                                                             
25 Black Law Dictionary, Forth Pocket Edition (2011) 
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use the value to influence the value recipient, the value cannot be 
regarded as a bribe and the provider cannot be deemed a briber. The main 
reason of establishing the corrupt defense is that anti-bribery law should 
not punish a, innocent value provider, like if the provided value is a gift 
for friendship or the value provider is forced to give the value without 
intent to influence the transaction.  
2) Minimum Value Threshold 
Neither China nor California punish a value provider if the value is 
significantly small. Under Article 164 of China’s Criminal Law, “whoever, 
for the purpose of seeking illegitimate benefits, gives money or property 
to any employee of a company or enterprise, if the amount involved is 
relatively large, shall be sentenced ….” Accordingly, the precondition for 
a criminal penalty is “the amount involved is relatively large.” Likewise, 
under the Penal Code Section 641.3, if the provided value is less than 
$250, the prosecutor of California cannot prosecute the value provider for 
commercial bribery. The main reason why the law does not use a criminal 
penalty to punish a small value bribe is that, compared to a relatively 
expensive briber, it is hard to prove a small bribe influenced a recipient’s 
decision. It is a common sense that a cup of Starbucks coffee is hard to 
bribe a party to award you the contract in a transaction.     
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Ⅳ. Bribing a Foreign Government Official or International Public 
Official  
1. Introduction 
China’s current criminal regulations on corruption and bribery are 
based on the 1997 version of China’s Criminal Law. In 1997, China’s 
does establish a criminal regulation on a bribery targeting a foreign state 
functionary or an international organization official. However, it does not 
mean China pays no attention in the bribery foreign public officials or 
public international organization officials. In 2003, China revised the 
Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China. Under Article 33 
of the Foreign Trade Law of China, a bribe is prohibited in a foreign trade 
transaction.  
In 2005, China joined the UNCAC. Article 16 of UNCAC prohibits 
the bribery of foreign public officials and officials of international public 
organizations. As a member of UNCAC, China is obligated to adjust its 
domestic law to reflect the requirements of UNCAC. Thus, China revised 
its criminal law in 2005 and added a new crime to prohibit the bribery of 
foreign public officials or international public organization officials. 26 
Most elements of this crime are similar with the crime of bribery of 
public functionary except the bribery target.  
                                                             
26 Eighth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (See 
https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/eighth-amendment-to-the-criminal-law-of-the-peoples-republi
c-of-china) 
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2. Why China created the crime of bribery of foreign public 
officials or international organization officials: 
First, China is has joined the UNCAC and, as a member of UNCAC, 
China is has a duty to adjust its domestic anti-corruption laws to the 
requirements of UNCAC.  
Second, China joined the OECD Working Group of the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention. Under Article 1 of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, “Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person 
intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other 
advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public 
official…”. Additionally, under Article 10, “Bribery of a foreign public 
official shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence under 
the laws of the Parties and the extradition treaties between them.” As a 
member of the Working Group, China should adjust its domestic law to 
reflect the convention.  
Third, with the increased development of China, China has become 
the one of the world’s two largest economies and more China local 
business entities have entered into the international market. Some 
businesses have strong incentives to use bribery to open other countries’ 
markets. For example, Hong Kong’s former Home Affairs Secretary and 
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the ex-Foreign Minister of Senegal was arrested by the United States for 
allegedly leading a multimillion-dollar bribery scheme in Africa on behalf 
of a top Chinese energy company.27 Without the crime of bribery of 
foreign public officials or international organization officials, it would be 
hard for China’s government to regulate corruption in the foreign markets 
between China’s businessman and foreign public officials or international 
organization officials. 
Part 3: What is a Bribe under China’s Law? 
Ⅰ. Introduction to the Definition of Bribery under China’s Law 
Context  
The definition of “bribe” has been experiencing a dynamic 
development process. Under article 389 of China’s Criminal Law, a bribe 
is defined as “money or property.” At this stage, bribes are limited to 
currency money and property. This definition resulted in a problem of 
some people using intangible benefits to bribe. Thus, to fulfill the gap, 
China’s Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate, 
holding power to interpret the legal scope of Chinese law, enacted a joint 
judicial interpretation.28 According to the new judicial interpretation, the 
                                                             
27 
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/2120784/us-arrests-former-hong-kong-home-secretar
y-patrick-ho 
28  Article 12 of The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of 
Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of the Law in the Handling of Criminal Bribery (See 
https://www.cov.com/files/upload/Carlson_SPP_SPC_Judicial_Interpretation_on_Bribery_Enforcement.pdf) 
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definition of bribery expands to property interests, which is defined as the 
money-accountable interest, like tokens, free travel, etc. This expansion is 
a constructive development because the bribers and recipients have 
become cleverer by hiding their bribery. However, this interpretation also 
leaves behind a gap of non-property interest, which may not be accounted 
for by money. Suppose a male businessman gets a government contract at 
the expense of having a sexual relationship with a female government 
officer. Under China’s current laws, the government officer may violate 
the governmental internal disciplines (which are not laws but nonetheless 
bound to all Chinese government officers) but it is hard to say the 
businessman has committed a bribery crime under Chinese current laws. 
This situation is not rare in China. Most Chinese government officers 
convicted of corruption are found in immoral sexual relationships with 
others simultaneously. Corruption and sex are inseparable. This gap of 
non-property interest is also identified in the Implement Review of the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption. From an economic 
perspective, bribery is regarded as a transaction: the briber is the supplier 
side, and the bribery recipient is the demand side. If we only punish one 
side and cannot prevent another side, illegal transactions are difficult to 
prevent.  
As we have discussed before, China has experienced dynamic process 
in defining the scope of bribery. The below chart clarifies what 
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constitutes bribery in the context of China laws:  
Types Bribery or Not Source of Law 
Money Yes Article 389 of 
Criminal Code (1997) 
Property (E.g., stock) Yes Article 389 of 
Criminal Code (1997) 
Money Accountable 
Property Interest 
(E.g., free travel and a 
waiver of a debt)  
Yes Judicial Interpretation 
of the Supreme 
People’s Court and the 
Supreme People’s 
Court and the 
Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate (2016) 
Non-Property Interest 
(E.g., Sex Bribery)  
No If the bribery receiver 
is working for the 
government and 
related governmental 
organizations 
especially he or she 
has joined in the 
Chinese Communist 
Party, he or she will 
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be punished by the 
internal discipline 
rules. However, the 
non-property interest 
briber, at lease, will 
not be criminally 
liable.  
 
Ⅱ. Foreign Countries and International Organizations’ Legal 
Practice regarding the Definition of Bribery  
1. United States 
Under the FCPA, a bribe is defined as “anything of value.” Unlike 
China, the FCPA does not distinguish a property interest or a 
non-property interest. Anything which is valuable could be used as a 
bribe even if the value is just an internship opportunity.29  
2. United Kingdom 
Under Section 1 of the UK Bribery Act 2010, a bribe is described as 
“a financial or other advantage.” Accordingly, in the United Kingdom, 
you can bribe a person with money or by offering other advantages, 
including non-property interest.  
                                                             
29 UNITED STATES V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. (S.D.N.Y.) 
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3. UNCAC 
Unlike the United States or the United Kingdom, the UNCAC 
adopted a different phrase, “undue advantage,” to describe “bribery”. 
Under Article 15 of the UNCAC, it is illegal to give or offer an undue 
advantage to an official to compel the official act or refrain from acting 
in the excise of his or her official duties. On the other side, UNCAC 
does not distinguish property interest and non-property interest, either.  
 
Ⅲ. A Comparative Perspective between China and Other Countries 
or International Organizations Regarding the Definition of Bribery. 
1. Vertical Comparison  
From 1997 to 2016, China has adopted a dynamic and developing 
attitude in identifying bribery. It is a development for China’s anti-bribery 
law to expand the scope of bribery from money and property to property 
interest.  
2. Horizontal Comparison  
However, comparing with the FCPA, the Anti-Bribery Act 2010, and 
the UNCAC, China law has an obvious gap: China law does not cover the 
non-property interest into the scope of China’s anti-bribery laws. To 
regulate the non-property interest is not only a requirement by UNCAC, 
 28 / 44 
 
but also is based on practical need.30 
First, without the non-property interest, this gap results in sexual 
bribery being unregulated by China’s current laws. Suppose the 
prosecutor prosecutes a businesswoman who received a contract from the 
public official at the expense of having a sexual relationship with him. 
Under China’s current laws, the public official will be accused of abusing 
his power. However, the it is hard to prove that the businesswoman is 
guilty.  
 Second, if Chinese law does not include the non-property interest in 
the scope of bribery, there leaves some grey areas. If a person receives a 
payment-free internship from JPMorgan, it is hard to determine that a 
payment-free internship is a property interest. 31 The defendants could 
argue that they do not get any direct benefits like money, property, or 
property interest from the internship except the experience. It is difficult 
to evaluate the payment-free internship in terms of money. The prosecutor 
may argue that the internship experience in JPMorgan will be helpful for 
them to find a better job in the future. But the argument is uncertain. 
Maybe the experience is helpful but maybe not. In all fairness, how a 
court interprets a payment-free internship opportunity is a legal 
uncertainty.  
                                                             
30 Article 15 of UNCAC 
31 UNITED STATES V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. (S.D.N.Y.)  
 29 / 44 
 
Part 4: Punishment and Remedy 
Ⅰ. Introduction 
Under Article 12 of UNCAC, member nations of UNCAC can use 
civil, administrative, or criminal penalties for failure to comply with such 
measures. China’s current legal regulations on bribery can be divided into 
three types: criminal sanctions, administrative regulations, and private 
enforcement (civil remedies), which constitute a system in regulating 
bribery.   
 
Ⅱ. Criminal Law Punishment 
Under China’s Criminal Law, the criminal law punishments imposed 
on bribers include criminal fines, criminal detention, fixed-term 
imprisonment, life imprisonment, and confiscation of property. 
Generally, the criminal punishment for bribing a China’s state 
functionary is harsher than that in a commercial bribery. That is because 
bribing a China’s state functionary not only distorts the market 
competition, but also erodes the loyalty of the people to the government.  
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Ⅲ. Administrative Law Punishment 
1. Introduction 
Before joining the UNCAC, China adopted administrative penalties 
in regulating bribery.  
In 1993, China has issued the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (1993 
version). Under article 8 of 1993 version, it is illegal to bribe your trading 
object party. In 2017, China amended the anti-unfair competition law 
(2017 version). The anti-unfair competition law is designed to regulate 
bribery in commercial transactions. 
 
2. Developments of 2017 Version  
1) More Detailed Definition of Commercial Bribery 
The 2017 version inherits the anti-commercial-bribery clause of 1993 
and expand it more comprehensive. In detail, the 2017 version divided 
commercial bribery into three types: 
 Bribing the opposite party of the transaction; 
 Bribing the party retained by the opposite party of the transaction 
(like the lawyer retained by the opposite party); and  
 Bribing the person/unit having power to influence the transaction 
The more detailed definition of commercial bribery is a significant 
development because in the 1993 version, there is a big gap: the 
legislature ignored that the bribery provider can bypass the regulation by 
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bribing the party retained by the opposite party of the transaction to 
achieve their purpose. The revised law has filled the gap by providing a 
more detailed definition of commercial bribery.  
 
2) Harsher Administrative Punishment on Commercial Bribery 
There is a 24-year distance between 1993 version and 2017 version. 
China has experienced a fabulous economic boom in the past 24 years. 
Both individuals and business entities have become richer and richer. 
According to IMF’s survey, China’s per capita GDP of 2017 is predicted 
to be about $6000; in 1993, it was only $377.  
In the1993 version, the administrative fine on commercial bribery 
ranges from RMB 10,000 (about $1500) to RMB 200,000 (about 
$30,000). This low fine makes it hard to deter and punish bribery 
violators in China. Accordingly, the 2017 version makes the 
administrative punishments harsher. First, it increases the maximum of 
the administrative fine to RMB 3 million (about $500,000) and it added a 
new punishment, business license revocation, which is a very strict 
punishment that excludes the violating business entity from the market. 32  
 
3. Boundary between Administrative Violation of Bribery and 
Criminal Violation of Bribery  
                                                             
32 Article 19 of China Anti-Unfair Competition Law (2017 Version). 
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Although both administrative violations and criminal violations are 
illegal, the penalties are significantly different. In the former, the violator 
may be punished by an administrative fine and or business license 
revocation; in the later, the violator may be punished by criminal fine and 
imprisonment.  
Thus, it is important to know the boundary between the administrative 
violation and the criminal violation. Under China’s current criminal code, 
the boundary is the bribery amount. In a natural person bribery providing 
scenario, if the worth of the bribe is more than RMB 10,000 (about 
$1500), the briber could be prosecuted by China’s prosecutors. In a 
unit-bribe providing scenario, if the worth of the bribe is more than RMB 
200,000 (about $30,000), the bribe provider could be prosecuted by 
China’s prosecutors. This amount is calculated by the total amount of 
bribes one briber provides rather a single instance of bribery. Accordingly, 
for example, a briber bribed RMB 2,000 to ten of China’s government 
officers, the briber is very likely to be charged of criminal bribery 
violation.  
This is a very low threshold, which resulted in many international 
corporations being found to have committed criminal violations of 
providing bribes in China. For example, the GlaxoSmithKline, one of the 
largest drug companies, violated China’s anti-bribery laws, and four 
senior executives of GlaxoSmithKline were sentenced guilty for 
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providing bribes to China’s related governmental officials and hospital 
executives. In this case, some doctors in the hospitals received red 
package bribes with less than RMB 10,000. But all of them are calculated 
into the amount of the bribe provided by GlaxoSmithKline. 
Ⅳ. Private Enforcement (Civil Remedy)  
1. Introduction  
Entitling private parties, including natural people and legal people, to 
standing in order to file a civil suit is a requirement of UNCAC.33 This 
rule has been adopted by many countries. For example, in California, a 
private victim is entitled to recover his or her damages due to the 
bribery. 34  China also established its private enforcement system in 
anti-bribery laws. Under the 1993 version of anti-unfair competition law, 
a bribery victim has a standing to bring a civil lawsuit and ask for 
monetary damages and the damages could be the victim’s actual damages. 
If the actual damages are difficult to calculate, the victim can ask the 
court to use benefits the bribery provider received from the bribery as a 
substitute of the actual damages. Once the defendant is held liable, he or 
she must be responsible for all of the plaintiff’s reasonable costs of 
discovery and reasonable attorney fees.  
In private enforcement, China adopts the torts law suit system: if a 
                                                             
33 Article 12 of UNCAC 
34 Section 3281 of California Civil Code 
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merchant could show it lost a customer to a bribe-payer, it could sue the 
briber for tortuous interference; and the merchant also can sue the 
bribe-taking employee for breach of fiduciary duty.   
 
2. Developments 
China has revised its anti-unfair competition law and issued its new 
version of anti-unfair competition law (2017 version). The biggest 
development of 2017 version in private enforcement is that 2017 version 
has established a statutory damage clause: under Article 17 of the 2017 
version, if the court finds that the actual damages or the defendant’s 
profits are hard to calculate, the court has discretion to grant a 
no-more-than RMB 3000,000 (about $500,000) to the plaintiff. 
The new statutory damages clause is a big achievement because in 
practice, sometimes the plaintiff cannot prove either actual damage or the 
defendant’s profits. Generally, even though the plaintiff can spend much 
money in employing an expert as an expert witness to show the actual 
damages or the defendant’s profits, it is hard to prove them in some 
complex transactions. Thus, the statutory changes could reduce the 
workload of the plaintiff and better compensate the plaintiff as well. In 
addition, establishing statutory damages has been adopted by many 
countries. For example, the California Unfair Competition Law has 
adopted a statutory-damage rule to compensate consumers who were 
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adversely affected by unfair business acts, including bribery violations.35 
Part 5: Defense: Specific Intent Defense  
Ⅰ. Introduction 
   The question is when a benefit provider provides benefits to a 
recipient, can he or she bring the defense that he or she did not have an 
intent to pursue an illegal interest? Regarding the question, the scholars in 
China are divided into two groups: general intent theory and specific 
intent theory. 
Ⅱ. Comparison: General Intent Theory and Specific Intent Theory  
1. General Intent Theory  
 
1) Definition 
Under this theory, a bribery violation just needs the briber to be 
willing to provide the bribery or to provide the bribery knowingly. 
2) Advantages and Disadvantages of General Intent Theory 
Regarding the general intent theory, the advantages are: it decreases 
the workload of the investigator and the burden of proof of the prosecutor, 
and it could have a stronger deterring effects to the public. However, it 
has obvious disadvantages: (1) the general intent theory may confuse the 
                                                             
35 Section 1780 of California Civil Code 
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distinction between a legal gift and an illegal bribe, and (2) the general 
intent theory may punish an innocent person who is forced to provide a 
bribe without a purpose to purse an illegitimate interest, or who is willing 
to provide a bribe with an intent to purse a legal interest. 
 
2. Specific Intent Theory 
1) Definition 
Under this theory, a general intent alone is not enough to constitute a 
bribery violation. A briber must have a specific intent to purse an 
illegitimate benefit.  
2) Advantages and Disadvantages of Specific Intent Theory  
The specific intent theory requires the court to distinguish between a 
legal gift and an illegal bribe, and protect the innocent bribery providers. 
However, the specific intent theory increases the workload of both 
investigators and prosecutors. However, a law which may deprive other 
people’s liberty, property, or life must be modest; a law should not 
wrongfully include any innocent people.  
Ⅲ. Foreign Law Practice  
     Unlike China’s Criminal Law, the FCPA does not use the phrase 
“illegitimate gains” to describe bribery. Conversely, the FCPA uses the 
phrase “corruptly” to describe bribery. To violate the FCPA, an offer, 
 37 / 44 
 
promise, or authorization of a payment, or a government official must be 
made corruptly.36 Under the United States Congress notes, the word 
“corruptly” means an intent or desire to wrongfully influence the 
recipient. The word “corruptly” is used in order to make clear that the 
offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient 
to misuse his official position. For example, to wrongfully direct business 
to the payor or his client, to obtain preferential legislation or regulations, 
or to induce a foreign official to perform or fail to perform an official 
function.37  
     Under American law, a general intent (willingness to provide 
payment knowingly) is not enough to trigger the FCPA or the domestic 
bribery statute. The provider must have a specific intent to influence the 
recipient.  
Ⅳ. Specific Intent Defense in China 
      In China, the majority trend in this question is regarding the 
specific intent theory. Under Article 389, “An act of giving state 
functionaries articles of property in order to seek illegitimate gain shall be 
considered a crime of offering bribes.”38  
                                                             
36 The FCPA does not explicitly define “corruptly”, but in drafting the statute Congress adopted the meaning 
ascribed to the same term in the domestic bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201.  
37 The House Report states in full: The word “corruptly” connotes an evil motive or purpose such as that required 
under 18 U.S.C. 201 (b) which prohibits domestic bribery. As in 18 U.S.C. 201(b) which prohibits domestic bribery. 
As in 18 U.S.C. 201(b), the word “corruptly” indicates an intent or desire wrongfully to influence the recipient. It 
does not require that the act [be] fully consummated or succeed in producing the desired outcome.  
38 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgvienna/eng/dbtyw/jdwt/crimelaw/t209043.htm 
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Here, a new question arises based on the specific intent theory: 
what is an illegitimate gain and what is a legitimate gain? In practice, the 
argument that the briber is pursing legal interests is the most common 
argument. To deal with this problem, China’s Supreme People's Court and 
Supreme People's Procuratorate enacted a joint judicial interpretation in 
2012.39 Under Article 12 of  this judicial interpretation, the concept of 
pursuing illegal interest is defined as: “(1) to pursue interests violating 
laws, administrative regulations, or administrative rules, or to ask the 
state functionary to violate laws, administrative regulations, 
administrative rules, public policies, or industry standards for facilitating 
the bribery provider obtaining an illegal interest; or (2) to pursue 
competition advantages by violating the equality principle and the equity 
principle.  
Accordingly, we can divide interests into three types: (1) legal 
interest, the interest you can get it without the bribe; (2) illegal interest: 
the interest you may obtain without the interest; and (3) the interest you 
cannot obtain without the bribery.  
An example of a legal interest is if a person is disabled and he is 
eligible to receive a disability subsidy under Chinese law. If Chinese 
government officials demand him to provide a bribe for getting the 
disability subsidiary, he is not guilty because the subsidiary is an illegal 
                                                             
39 http://www.spp.gov.cn/flfg/sfjs/201301/t20130101_52307.shtml 
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interest. An example of an illegal interest is how people wanting to apply 
for a vehicle license plate must attend the plate lottery and if the 
applicants have satisfied all the requirements the interest of a vehicle 
plate is likely to be obtained by the applicants. But if an applicant 
provides a bribe to the plate lottery officer for obtaining the plate, he or 
she will violate anti-bribery laws. 
 The below chart illustrates the relationship between different types 
of interests and bribery under the context of China’s anti-bribery law: 
Types of Interest Illegal or Legal 
You cannot obtain the interest 
without the bribery 
Illegitimate  
You may obtain the interest 
without the bribery 
Illegitimate 
You can obtain the interest without 
the briery 
Legitimate  
Accordingly, one can define the scope of a legal interest under the 
context of anti-bribery laws of China as the interest you can obtain 
without the bribery. And the scope of an illegal interest is that (1) you 
cannot obtain the interest without the bribery; or (2) you may obtain the 
interest with the bribery. Accordingly, if a person provides bribery with 
an intent to pursue a legitimate interest, he or she will not violate China’s 
anti-bribery laws. 
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Part 6: Drawbacks and Proposals 
Ⅰ. Redefine the Concept of Bribery  
As discussed previously, the definition of the bribe in China’s 
current law context does not contain the non-property interest. China has 
been criticized by the UNCAC Implement Review Group because of this 
gap, which could facilitate the bribe because of the non-property interest.  
Regulating the non-property interest bribery is not only a 
requirement of the UNCAC, but also has been adopted by many countries. 
For example, FCPA does not distinguish property interest or non-property 
interest in the definition of bribery; rather, under the FCPA, giving 
anything of value to any foreign official may constitute bribery. Likewise, 
Article 15 of UNCAC defines bribery as any undue advantage. In practice, 
the briber has used non-property interest in bribing. For example, in 
JPMorgan, JPMorgan agreed to pay $264.4 million to the Department of 
Justice, Securities and Exchange Commission, and Federal Reserve to 
resolve FCPA offenses for awarding prestigious jobs to relatives and 
friends of Chinese government officials in order to be awarded banking 
contracts.40 In this case, it is hard to say that the prestigious jobs awards 
are property interests or could be calculated by money. However, it also 
constitutes bribery under American law.  
                                                             
40 UNITED STATES V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. (S.D.N.Y.) 
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Accordingly, China should expand its definition of bribery and 
incorporate the non-property interest into its definition. In detail, 
regarding the definition of bribery, China should just use the term “undue 
advantage” or “anything of value” to describe what is bribery.  
 
Ⅱ. Compulsory Internal Control Mechanism  
1. Foreign Country Experience in Internal Control Mechanism 
If we compare the corruption to a pest on the apple, we can regard 
an internal control mechanism as a bottle of insecticide. Good insecticide 
could prevent the pest assaulting your fruits.  
The accounting provision is one of the two main clauses in FCPA. It 
requires issuers to create and enforce an effective internal control system 
reducing and managing the corruption risks. In detail, it requires the 
issuers to make and keep books, records, and accounts accurately and 
fairly reflecting the transactions and dispositions of the issuer’s assets. 
Additionally, it also requires that the issuers create and maintain a good 
system of internal accounting. This provision pushes issuers in America 
to do more in self-management of risk of corruption. Likewise, a good 
accounting system could facilitate SEC and DOJ’s investigation against 
potential corruption violations. For China, a good internal accounting 
program is not difficult to implement. Many China’s big companies have 
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employed top accounting firms to keep books, records, and accounts 
accurately and fairly reflecting the transactions and dispositions of the 
assets of the issuer. The problem here is that China lacks a compulsory 
internal control provision that would require big companies, like issuers 
and state-owned or controlled companies, to establish a good internal 
control system.  
 
2. Having Good Internal Control Program beyond Legal 
Requirement  
Many big companies have established good internal control 
programs to reduce their internal corruption risks. The following reasons 
encourage the companies to establish higher-standard internal control 
systems: 
First, an effective internal control program can eliminate the risks of 
embezzlement, self-dealing, bribery, etc.  
Second, a good internal control program may help the company to 
mitigate and defended its legal liability. For example, under the FCPA, 
individuals are only subject to the FCPA’s criminal penalties for 
violations of the accounting provisions if they acted “willfully.” 41 The 
term “willfully” means the company is voluntarily and intentionally 
failing to establish or implement the internal control program. 42  A 
                                                             
41 15 U.S. Code § 78ff 
42 See Black Law Dictionary, Forth Pocket Edition (2011) 
 43 / 44 
 
company could argue that it has tried its best efforts to establish and 
implement its internal control program and the failure is not its fault. In 
this scenario, the company is not willfully breaching the internal control 
provision. Thus, the FCPA may not impose criminal liability on the 
company. Accordingly, companies have the incentive to establish good 
internal control programs to mitigate or eliminate its potential liability.  
 
3. China’s Current Internal Control Practice 
Some big companies in China have established compliance system 
designed to reduce the risk of corruption. However, China has not 
established a rule to require all the insurers and other big companies in 
China to establish internal control mechanisms. According, China’s 
current regulations neglect corruption regulation.  
 
4. Who should be Covered by the Internal Control Mechanism?  
A. Issuers of Securities Registered in China’s Security Stock 
Exchanges 
Like FCPA, China’s future accounting provision should require the 
listed companies to establish and enforce a good internal control 
mechanism. Because these companies are big companies and their stocks 
can be purchased by the public. Once corruption occurs, the corruption 
will not only erode the honesty and loyalty of the government and the 
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competition of the market, but also could affect huge middle and small 
sized stockholders’ interest. Thus, the internal control’s main target must 
be the issuers of securities. 
 
B. State-Owned/Controlled Enterprises 
Unlike the United States, China is a socialist country, which has 
lots of state-owned/controlled business enterprises. And compared with 
private companies, theses state-owned or controlled business enterprises 
are more likely to have corruption scandals. Thus, China should establish 
a compulsory internal control rule in the future covering state-owned or 
controlled business enterprises. It not only because the state-owned or 
controlled enterprise have high incidence of corruptions but also because 
the wealth managed by the state-owned/controlled enterprises belongs to 
all citizens of China.  
 
 
 
 
 
